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Abstract 
Domino effects or cascade events in the chemical and process industries are since three decades 
recognized as possible accident scenarios. They represent a growing concern since they hold the 
potential to cause devastating consequences. The ‘domino effect’ as a phenomenon, is also a 
controversial topic when its assessment is required. A number of different approaches exist in technical 
standards and in literature. The present contribution aims at providing an orientation and a number of 
up-to-date sources for the assessment of escalation leading to domino scenarios, and to the assessment 
of safety distances to prevent escalation. An overview of current regulations in the European framework 
is also provided in this paper.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Mexico City disaster that took place in November 1984 [1], calling for 542 fatalities and huge 
destruction, is possibly one of the best known domino accidents that ever affected an industrial site. 
Since that event, a specific concern on domino accidents was raised in the chemical and process 
industries. Also as a consequence of requirements from the legislation (EU Directives), technical 
standards and preventive measures, such as safety distances, fireproofing and emergency water deluges 
were introduced specifically to control and reduce the probability of domino events [2]. However, the 
complexity of domino scenarios caused a rather jeopardized approach to the issue, which turned out in 
the existence of different approaches, methods and thresholds.  
Different tools and even different values for safety distances concerning the same phenomenon are 
adopted in different countries [3]. This was the consequence of the technical and managerial 
complexities going hand in hand with domino effect- or escalation events. Moreover, even the adoption 
of a single definition of such events in the literature, in technical documents and in the regulations was 
hampered and has never been realized [4]. 
As pointed out by Larsen et al. [3], inspection services from European Member States mention that, 
amongst other problems, one of the more important challenges, when it comes to the follow-up of the 
current legislation concerning domino effect between adjacent industrial sites, is the lack of criteria for 
the identification of establishments being obliged to exchange information due to their proximity and 
possibility of domino effects. Another problem arising due to insufficient harmonization between the 
different European countries in the field of domino effect is that sites may be classified as ‘domino 
establishment’ in one country, while if situated in another country they might obtain the status of ‘non-
domino establishment’ due to the different thresholds being used in the EU Member States, and due to 
the different domino distance calculations across Europe.  
The present contribution, starting from an up-to-date definition of domino effect, a review is provided 
of escalation thresholds and safety distances for domino effects in the process industry, with the aim of 
defining a process that may lead to the selection of appropriate values, based on a physically-sound 
analysis of escalation mechanisms. 
 
2. Definition of Domino Effect 
 
This section discusses which parameters should be looked at in order to understand the escalation 
possibility, and what actually constitutes a domino effect. Actually, no universally-accepted definition 
of a domino effect exists in the technical and scientific literature, due to the complexity of such events 
and due to the different perspectives that may be adopted in their analysis. Nevertheless, defining what 
should be considered as a domino accident is not a mere academic exercise, since several technical 
standards as well as the European legislation specifically demand the assessment of “domino effects”. 
For example, article 9 of the European Directive 2012/18/EU (the so-called “Seveso-III” Directive) [5] 
    
  
requires to identify establishments that may be affected by domino scenarios and to include such 
scenarios in safety reports and in major accident prevention policies (MAPPs). 
Due to the inexistence of a non-polysemous formalization to describe the domino effect phenomenon, 
most of the EU Member States’ competent authorities refer to the definition given by Article 8 of 
Council Directive 96/82/EC (the so-called “Seveso-II” Directive, reported in Table 1) [6]. However, the 
latter only considers accidents that propagate from one establishment to another establishment (also 
called ‘external domino effect’) and omits the so-called internal domino effects [4]. This limited 
definition is unchanged in Article 9 of Directive Seveso-III, which will enter into force on 1 June 2015 
[5]. If the definition provided by EU legislation is adopted, safety managers may meet regulatory 
requirements (safety report, major accident prevention policies, licensing…) without assessing part of 
the risk resulting from escalation possibility, and specifically that of escalation from one to another plant 
unit inside the same Seveso site. Another obvious limit of the definition reported in the Seveso 
Directives is the fact that it concerns only Seveso installations. An accident in one Seveso plant can 
affect a nearby installation not falling under the obligations of Seveso Directives, or vice-versa. For 
these reasons, some EU Member States (see Table 1) proposed their own definition. The Member State 
competent authorities in these countries adopted their own specific definition, either formally or 
informally. In France the Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Development adopts the definition given 
by Vallee et al. [7]. In Belgium, Wallonian practices use the definition proposed by Delvosalle [8], 
whereas the Flemish Ministry of Environment, Nature and Energy adopts the definition given by 
Gorrens et al. [9]. In Italy no specific official definition is yet available, although several guidance 
documents and draft decrees recognize domino effects being possible, not only across different Seveso 
establishments, but also from one unit to another within the same establishment. In the United Kingdom, 
in order to implement the Seveso II Directive, the following definition of a domino effect is reported in 
the Control of Major Accident Hazard (COMAH) Regulations: “In some circumstances a major 
accident at one COMAH establishment might be triggered by an incident at another COMAH 
establishment (the so-called domino effect). The initiating event needs not necessarily to be a major 
accident itself but must be at a COMAH establishment, either top-tier or lower-tier, and involve a 
defined dangerous substance” [10]. 
 
Table 1 summarizes some definitions proposed within the EU in order to specify the notion of ‘domino 
effect’, especially with reference to the chemical and process industries. As evident from the table, no 
agreement is present. This also emerged from the rather different interpretations given to the concept of 
domino effect in an expert workshop recently organized (Expert Workshop on Domino Effect, 
University of Bologna, 2014) [11]. 
 
In order to avoid jumbling this perception and adding confusion, it may be interesting to go back to 
studies that have pointed out the sequential nature of events leading to an accident, so as to remove 
ambiguity. This was underlined for the first time by Heinrich [12] with respect to accident modelling, 
introducing what has become known as the ‘domino theory’, where the author described the accident as 
a chain of independent events that occur in particular order, causing harm [13]. However, the domino 
theory is not to be confused with the “domino effect” phenomenon, the latter constituting the focus of 
this paper. Indeed, Heinrich’s domino theory does not join the meaning of domino effect as it was 
defined in Table 1, since it does not consider the propagation of a major accident that occurs in one unit 
to other nearby units. Heinrich’s theory only discusses and explains the sequence of events that has led 
to an occupational accident. 
 
In order to unambiguously identify the character of the domino event under consideration, Reniers [14] 
proposed a classification, which categorizes domino events according to the various features that 
    
  
domino scenarios may have. Four categories are suggested, each having two subcategories: category.1 
(internal or external), category.2 (direct or indirect), category.3 (temporal or spatial), and category.4 (in 
serial or parallel). 
 
Table 1: Domino effect definitions 
Author (s) Domino effect definition 
Council Directive 
96/82/EC [6] 
Domino effects, where establishments are sited in such a way or so close together as to 
increase the probability and possibility of major accidents, or aggravate their 
consequences. 
Cozzani et al. [15] 
Italy 
 
 
Accidental sequences having at least three common features: 1) a primary accidental 
scenario, which initiates the domino accidental sequence. 2) the propagation of the 
primary event, due to “an escalation factor” generated by the physical effects of the 
primary scenario, that results in the damage of at least one secondary equipment item. 
3) one or more secondary events (i.e. fire, explosion and toxic dispersion), involving 
the damaged equipment items (the number of secondary events is usually the same of 
the damaged plant items). 
Delvosalle [8] 
Wallonia 
(Belgium) 
A cascade of events in which the consequences of a previous accident are increased by 
following one(s), as well spatially as temporally, leading to a major accident 
Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) 
[10] The United 
Kingdom  
In some circumstances a major accident at one COMAH establishment might be 
triggered by an incident at another COMAH establishment (the so-called domino 
effect). The initiating event needs not necessarily to be a major accident itself but must 
be at a COMAH establishment, either top-tier or lower-tier, and involve a defined 
dangerous substance. 
Gorrens et al. [9] 
Flanders 
(Belgium). 
A major accident in a so-called secondary installation which is caused by failure of a 
so-called external hazards source. 
Vallee et al. [7] 
France 
An accidental phenomenon affecting one or more installations in an establishment that 
can cause an accidental phenomenon in an adjacent establishment, leading to a general 
increase in consequences. 
 
With the purpose of standardizing the domino effect definition intended to progress towards a non-
polysemous formalization to describe the phenomenon and converge to a broad consensus, at least 
within the scientific community, Reniers and Cozzani [4] have proposed the following definition: “An 
accident in which a primary unwanted event propagates within an equipment (‘temporally’), or/and to 
nearby equipment (‘spatially’), sequentially or simultaneously, triggering one or more secondary 
unwanted events, that may in turn trigger further (higher order) unwanted events, resulting in overall 
consequences more severe than those of the primary event”. 
The above definition encompasses all specific aspects found in most domino event definitions, including 
the four categories cited above [14] as well as the concept of local domino effect, proposed by 
Abdolhamidzadeh et al. [16]. Thus, on the basis of the definition suggested by Reniers and Cozzani [4], 
the key elements of a domino accident are propagation (“a primary unwanted event propagates...”) and 
escalation (“resulting in more severe consequences”). Therefore, when assessing a domino accident, 
three elements should be clearly assessed: 
(i) The primary event (that is, the accident scenario of concern and its final outcome expressed 
in terms of physical effects - thermal radiation, overpressure, etc.) 
    
  
(ii) The possible significant secondary scenarios that may be triggered by propagation of the 
primary event (that are, the secondary scenarios started by the damage of equipment items 
causing the release of hazardous substances resulting in final outcomes able to “escalate” 
the primary scenario) 
(iii) The relevant secondary targets (equipment items that may be damaged by the primary 
event and that, if damaged, have the potential to cause final outcomes escalating the 
primary event) 
 
It is clear from the above that on the one hand damage distances are crucial to assess the actual potential 
of a primary scenario in triggering a domino effect. On the other hand, damage alone is not an element 
that characterizes a domino event: in order to produce an escalation, the final outcome of the secondary 
scenario should have the potential to cause further damage or fatalities with respect to that already 
caused by the primary scenario. In the preliminary assessment of domino effect, it is thus crucial to 
understand which primary scenarios have the potentiality to trigger escalation and what are the safety 
distances to prevent these events. 
 
3. Damage and Escalation Thresholds 
 
Damage and escalation thresholds are a valuable approach to identify secondary scenarios possibly 
resulting from a domino effect. The results of consequence analysis models applied to the simulation of 
primary scenarios may easily be compared to threshold values, identifying a maximum credible 
escalation radius [17]. Such procedure is simple and transparent, although it oversimplifies somehow 
the problem, reducing escalation assessment to a mono-dimensional problem. However, due to its 
simplicity, the approach is useful at least as a screening tool [4]. 
 
Nonetheless, as already mentioned, the issue is quite controversial since a relevant uncertainty exists in 
threshold values for escalation. Actually, proposed threshold values span over orders of magnitude 
[15,18]. This is due to the number of factors that influence the possible propagation of the primary 
accident: e.g. the duration of the scenario that may influence the possibility of escalation due to radiation, 
the design features of the possible target equipment, etc. Moreover, the damage of a secondary 
equipment is not sufficient to trigger a domino accident by itself: in order to obtain a relevant domino 
accident, escalation should be present: the overall consequences of the domino scenario should be higher 
than those of the primary event. Thus, a minor pool fire triggered as a consequence of a devastating 
explosion may not be considered a relevant escalation, since the consequences of the primary explosion 
may be by far more relevant. If this is not kept in mind, almost all severe industrial accidents should be 
considered as domino events. 
 
Table 2 shows the primary scenarios that are more likely to trigger escalation effects [4]. Definition, 
modelling details and physics of the scenarios listed in Table 2 are widely described in literature [19-
21]. As shown in the table, three main escalation vectors were identified: heat radiation or flame 
impingement, overpressure and fragment projection. Toxic release was excluded from the present 
analysis because this physical effect does not result directly in a loss of containment (LOC) or in the 
damage of secondary equipment [22]. 
Thresholds values can be effectively used to describe the minimum intensity of primary scenarios able 
to trigger escalation. Actually, some scenarios may not be able to critically damage secondary 
equipment, either because not sufficiently intense (e.g. low energy explosions) or because of their quick 
time evolution (e.g. flash-fires). For other scenarios, vulnerability may depend on the characteristics of 
the target unit. For example, different thresholds for escalation can be defined for scenarios involving 
    
  
Table 2: Direct escalation: escalation vectors generated by different categories of primary scenarios.  
Primary scenario Escalation vector 
pool fire radiation, fire impingement 
jet fire radiation, fire impingement 
fireball radiation, fire impingement 
flash fire fire impingement 
mechanical explosion fragment projection, overpressure 
confined explosion fragment projection, overpressure 
BLEVE fragment projection, overpressure 
VCE overpressure, fire impingement 
toxic release --- 
BLEVE: Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion; VCE: Vapour Cloud Explosion. 
 
blast wave as escalation vector, depending on the type of target equipment and on the material contained 
in the target vessels that may be damaged. This is the combined result of (i) the different toughness of 
the equipment to the escalation vector, and (ii) the different damage states required to initiate a severe 
secondary scenario depending on the physical properties of the substances involved in the loss of 
containment. 
Several authors have reported different and apparently contradictory threshold values for equipment 
“damage” caused by overpressure or radiation (Fig. 1 and 2; Table 3). The wide uncertainty in threshold 
values derives from the complexity of the escalation phenomenon. Among the factors which may have 
caused these apparent inconsistencies in literature data, with reference to overpressure effects, two seem 
the more important: (i) the complete lack of indications on the specific characteristics of target 
equipment; and (ii) the ambiguities in the definition of “damage” and/or “loss”. As regards radiation 
effects, other factors in addition to the ones mentioned, may greatly influence the possibility of 
escalation, and thus may be at the origin of these inconsistencies, as they are seldom taken into account: 
(iii) the damage mechanism of the primary scenario (fire impingement or distant radiation); and (iv) the 
duration of the fire scenario (exposure time).  
 
 
Fig.1: Thermal radiation thresholds for domino effect proposed by different authors.  
 
Thresholds suggested by the international Oil and Gas Producers association, (OGP, Table 3) [23,24] 
are recommended as a starting point (conservative) for evaluation of damage due to explosions and fires.  
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OGP emphasizes the fact that the proposed values are only indicative and that the vulnerability of a 
plant (structure) should be determined based on an assessment of the criticality of the structure followed 
by a proportionate modelling approach (i.e. one based on the criticality and complexity).  
 
 
Fig.2: Overpressure thresholds for domino effect proposed by different authors. 
 
Table 3: Damage estimates based on overpressure/thermal radiation effect proposed by OGP. 
Escalation 
vector 
Threshold Target equipment Effect/damage 
Radiation 
(kW/m2) 
12.5 Not specified  Thin steel with insulation on the side away from 
the fire may reach thermal stress level high 
enough to cause structural failure. 
25 Not specified Unprotected steel will reach thermal stress 
temperatures that can cause failure. 
35 Not specified  Cellulosic material will pilot ignite within one 
minute’s exposure. 
Overpressure 
(mbar) 
207 Cone / Floating roof tank Unit uplifts “half tilted”                                                                                               
207 Oil storage tanks Rupture 
241-483 Cracking reactor Unit moves and pipes break 
276 Chemical reactor Unit moves and pipes break 
379 Fractionation column Frame cracks 
414 Horizontal pressure vessel Frame deforms & unit moves and pipes break                                                                            
448 Extraction column Unit moves and pipes break 
517 Heat exchanger Unit moves and pipes break                                                           
552 -965 Spherical tank Unit moves and pipes break 
827 Vertical pressure vessel Unit moves and pipes break                                                                                                   
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A conceptual framework based on the description of secondary target damage by a discrete number of 
structural damage states (DS) and of loss intensities (LI) was proposed to approach the problem [25]. 
The analysis carried out evidenced that while severe damage states always lead to large loss intensities 
and, consequently to severe secondary scenarios, also minor structural damages can trigger severe 
secondary consequences if specific operative conditions and material hazards are present. An example 
is the case of volatile toxic substances contained in pressurized equipment, which may form relevant 
toxic dispersions also in case of relatively moderate leak diameters (e.g. failure of connection nozzles). 
Therefore, specific escalation thresholds, rather than thresholds for structural damage, should be used 
in the analysis of escalation hazard. Table 4 reports threshold values for damage and escalation obtained 
for several accident scenarios. The thresholds in the table were obtained from the analysis of literature 
data and from simplified structural models, validated on the basis of a wide number of representative 
case-studies. A sensitivity analysis of all factors affecting the escalation possibility was also performed, 
in order to assess critical values for the different parameters [15]. 
 
 
 
    
  
 
Table 4: Damage and escalation thresholds (adapted from [15]).                                                                                  
I, heat radiation intensity; P, maximum peak static overpressure; R, Energy scaled distance: ME, Multi Energy method [26]; BS, Baker-Sthrelow method [27,28]. 
Scenario  Escalation vector  Modality  Target category  Damage threshold  Escalation threshold  Safety distance  
Flash fire  Heat radiation  Fire impingement  Floating roof tanks  Damage unlikely Flame envelope Max. flame distance  
   All other units Damage unlikely Escalation unlikely  –  
Fireball  Heat radiation  Flame engulfment  Atmospheric  I > 100 kW/m2 I > 100 kW/m2 Maximum flame distance 
   Pressurized  Damage unlikely  Escalation unlikely  – 
  Distant radiation  Atmospheric  I > 100 kW/m2 I > 100 kW/m2 Maximum flame distance 
   Pressurized  Damage unlikely  Escalation unlikely  – 
Jet fire  Heat radiation  Fire impingement  All  Flame envelope Flame envelope – 
  Stationary radiation  Atmospheric  I >15 kW/m2 I >15 kW/m2 50 m from flame envelope 
   Pressurized  I > 45 kW/m2 I > 45 kW/m2 25 m from flame envelope 
Pool fire  Heat radiation  Flame engulfment  All  Flame envelope Flame envelope – 
  Stationary radiation  Atmospheric  I > 15 kW/m2 I > 15 kW/m2 50m from pool border 
   Pressurized  I > 45 kW/m2 I > 45 kW/m2 20m from pool border 
VCE  Overpressure  Blast wave interaction  Atmospheric  P > 7 kPa P > 22 kPa R =1.75 (ME); 1.50 (BS) 
   Pressurized P > 20 kPa P > 20 kPa R = 2.10 (ME); 1.80 (BS) 
   Elongated (toxic) P > 14 kPa P > 20 kPa R = 2.10 (ME); 1.80 (BS) 
   Elongated (flammable)  P > 14 kPa P > 31 kPa R = 1.35 (ME); 0.85 (BS) 
 Heat radiation  Fire impingement  See flash fire  See flash fire  See flash fire  See flash fire 
Confined  Overpressure  Blast wave interaction  Atmospheric  P > 7 kPa P > 22 kPa 20 m from vent 
explosion   Pressurized P > 20 kPa P > 20 kPa 20 m from vent 
   Elongated (toxic) P > 14 kPa P > 20 kPa 20 m from vent 
   Elongated (flammable)  P > 14 kPa P > 31 kPa 20 m from vent 
Mechanical  Overpressure  Blast wave interaction  Atmospheric  P > 7 kPa P > 22 kPa R = 1.80 
explosion   Pressurized  P > 20 kPa P > 20 kPa R = 2.00 
   Elongated (toxic) P > 14 kPa P > 20 kPa R = 2.00 
   Elongated (flammable)  P > 14 kPa P > 31 kPa R = 1.20 
 Missile projection   All  Fragment impact  Fragment impact  300 m (prob. < 5×10−2) 
BLEVE  Overpressure  Blast wave interaction  Atmospheric  P > 7 kPa P > 22 kPa R = 1.80 
   Pressurized P > 20 kPa P > 20 kPa R = 2.00 
   Elongated (toxic) P > 14 kPa P > 20 kPa R = 2.00 
   Elongated (flammable)  P > 14 kPa P > 31 kPa R = 1.20 
 Missile projection  All  Fragment impact  Fragment impact  300 m (prob. < 5×10−2) 
Point-source    Blast wave interaction Atmospheric  P > 7 kPa P > 22 kPa – 
explosion   Pressurized P > 20 kPa P > 20 kPa – 
   Elongated (toxic) P > 14 kPa P > 20 kPa – 
   Elongated (flammable)  P > 14 kPa P > 31 kPa – 
    
  
4. Escalation safety distances 
 
The intensity of each escalation vector depends on the total amount of energy (or substance) which is 
possibly released from the primary system of containment (reactor, storage tank, etc.). The maximum 
distance at which escalation effects may be considered credible is called “safety distance”. The safety 
distance is the minimum separation distance between units required to avoid an escalation event. If 
threshold values for escalation are available, the safety distance may be easily calculated by the 
application of standard literature models for consequence assessment [29-31]. Based on these 
considerations, Cozzani et al. proposed simplified normograms for the swift assessment of safety 
distances [4, 17, 32]. The safety distances not only closely reflect the nature of the escalation vector, but 
also depend on the primary accident scenario and the characteristics of the target unit. 
In case of flash-fire scenarios, the extension of the flame envelope is the safety distance for potential 
sources of flammable vapours (e.g. floating roof tanks), while other kind of equipment is usually 
unaffected by such scenario.  
For fireballs, a safety distance related to the radius of the fireball should be assumed only for atmospheric 
vessels. In fact, recent results confirmed that the possibility of escalation may be reasonably excluded 
for pressurized vessels, even in the absence of passive protections [15].  
In the case of jet fires, the safety distance depends on the maximum flame length and direction. A study 
by Cozzani et al. [15] suggests that the time to failure for atmospheric vessels is always higher than 15 
min for targets within 50 m from the flame envelope. The value of 15 min was assumed as a reference 
time for activation of mitigation actions having a high probability of success (e.g. activation of water 
deluges at the arrival of the fire brigade). Since in general no passive fire protection is used on 
atmospheric tanks, this value may be assumed as the safety distance in the case of jet fires. With respect 
to pressurized vessels, the minimum value calculated by Cozzani et al. [15] for the time to failure is of 
about 13 min. These values are comparable to the time assumed as necessary for an effective mitigation. 
Thus, an escalation as a consequence of stationary radiation, without flame impingement, may not be 
excluded for an unprotected pressurized vessel. However, pressurized vessels have usually passive fire 
protections (thermal insulation), as well as active protections (water deluges), that may raise the actual 
value of the time to failure up to safe values. Therefore, the escalation involving pressurized vessels is 
scarcely credible in the case of distant source radiation from jet fires. Furthermore, even in the case of 
unprotected vessels, the escalation is definitely not credible for distances higher than 25 m from the 
flame envelope in the jet direction.  
The same analysis applied to pool fires evidenced that escalation may be considered possible for 
atmospheric vessels at distances lower than 50 m from pool border with a reference time of 15 min [15]. 
In the case of pressurized vessels, a conservative safety distance of 20 m may be assumed, although this 
value may be further reduced taking into account the effect of thermal insulation. For scenarios involving 
overpressure as escalation vector, the safety distance depends primarily on the amount of energy 
released in the scenario, as well as on the type of scenario. The safety distance is related to the distance 
at which the peak overpressure of the blast wave equals the threshold values for damage by overpressure.  
In the case of VCEs, this may be calculated by the standard approach used in QRA [29,31] estimating 
the explosion energy and evaluating the “strength” of explosion on the basis of plant lay-out and fuel 
reactivity, i.e. the “strength factor F” for the Multi-Energy method [26]or the flame Mach number (Mf) 
in the Baker-Sthrelow methodology [28]. The explosion of industrial equipment due to the internal 
combustion of gases, vapours or dust, is in general destructive even for high strength enclosures. Hence, 
venting devices are often introduced for mitigation purposes. When the vent section opens, the rapid 
depressurization through the vent section may produce a blast wave. External explosions due to the 
combustion of un-burnt gases released after the vent opening were also observed [33,34]. The analysis 
    
  
of safety distances by Cozzani et al. [15] evidenced as failures due to overpressure effects are not 
possible for targets located more than 20 m from the vent outlet.  
Missiles are an escalation vector generated in the case of mechanical explosions and BLEVEs. The 
escalation is caused by the missile impact on a target vessel, causing a loss of containment. This requires 
two conditions to be verified: the distance of the target vessel must be lower than the maximum credible 
projection distance and the impact must be followed by a loss of containment at the target vessel. The 
latter requirement is usually assumed to be verified in the conservative approach used in the assessment 
of missile damage [35,36]. The distance of projection is mainly dependent on the initial missile velocity, 
direction and on the drag factor [29]. For most mechanical explosions, the maximum projection distance 
of fragments is usually higher than 1000 m and projection distances up to 900 m were observed in past 
accidents [35,37,38]. Since these distances are well beyond typical inter-unit distances of a plant, 
defining an escalation threshold based solely on possible projection distances is therefore impractical. 
However, the probability of impact quickly decreases with the projection distance. A study by Gubinelli 
et al. [15,35] shows that the impact probability of a fragment form a mechanical explosion is about 
3×10−1 at 100 m and of 5×10−2 at 300 m. In the case of BLEVE, conservative values of impact probability 
are of 2.5×10−1 at 100 m and of 2.5×10−2 at 300 m. Once defined a tolerability criteria for impact 
probability, these findings can be used to evaluate likely affected areas. It should be clear that such 
distances do not take into account the role of safety barriers. 
 
5. Approach to domino effect assessment in EU member states 
 
As discussed above, current regulations and technical standards are influenced by the jeopardized 
approach to domino effects that took place since the issue became of concern. Nevertheless, the more 
frequent approach in regulations and standards is based on threshold values.  
Although the application of the Seveso Directives in the EU Member States should be based on methods 
and tools for the identification of sites liable to trigger domino effects, no generally accepted procedure 
to accomplish such task is available. This is somehow the result of the lack of a harmonized approach 
to the assessment of major accident hazard in the European countries, where either qualitative, 
quantitative, or semi-quantitative approaches are used, depending on the Member State. In 2012, the EC 
Joint Research Centre and the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection released a report concerning 
the approach to domino effect in Europe [3]. The report evidenced that not all countries1 have identified 
the “domino establishments” (only 14 countries did report to have completed such activity). 
Furthermore, the vast majority of EU MS have no specific tools (guidelines, checklists, models, 
software) dedicated to the assessment of domino effects. Evaluation of possible domino effects is either 
carried out as a part of the safety report assessment, or as a separate activity where the inspection 
authorities are not involved at all. Furthermore, in the vast majority of the countries, non-Seveso 
establishments are not in any way included in the inspections of neighbouring Seveso establishments as 
potential targets of escalation leading to domino scenarios. 
Therefore, no harmonized EU guidelines or recommendations for the assessment of domino effect 
distances exist. In order to gather updated information on the topic, a survey was carried out within ten 
EU member states (MS). The survey was focused on threshold values used for the assessment of safety 
distances for escalation leading to domino scenarios and on the definition of domino effect adopted in 
the Member States, and was addressed to safety experts or to members of competent authorities for 
Seveso Directive implementation. The survey carried out within the present study evidenced that each 
Member State has its own approach to deal with domino effects, even if most are based on predefined 
                                                          
1 The study was conducted on Seveso countries which are considered to include the 27 EU Member States, Norway and Iceland as countries 
of the European economic area, and Croatia, an EU Candidate Country. 
    
  
threshold values or safety distances. Table 4 reports the threshold values collected for the eight EU 
Member States included in the survey that apply threshold values in domino assessment: Belgium, 
France, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Reference to legislation 
related to threshold values, assessment methods/software tools used, and other details reported by the 
respondents, are provided in annex 1. As evident from Fig. 3, the proposed values span over an order of 
magnitude.  
 
a 
 
b
 
Fig. 3: (a) Overpressure thresholds for domino effects in different EU Member States without specification of 
targets. (b) Thermal radiation thresholds for domino effects in different EU Member States. 
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 Table 4: Summary of domino threshold values in eight EU Member States. 
 a In contrast to the other MS, in the UK the reported thresholds are set for human (used for the identification of domino groups based on human vulnerability, details are given in section 5) 
Country Threshold values 
Overpressure effects Radiation effects Mechanical effects 
Member State region 
Flanders, Belgium 
Threshold 1: 100 mbar (total collapse of warehouses)                   
Threshold 2: 160 mbar (damage of pressurized 
installations)                                                                        
Threshold 3: 450 mbar (total collapse of pressurized 
installations)                                                                                         
Threshold 1: 8 kW/m2 (unprotected installation item)                            
Threshold 2: 32 kW/m2 (protected installation item)                               
Threshold 3: 44 kW/m2 (protected pressure storage) 
Threshold 1: rupture of wing of wind turbine                                                          
Threshold 2: height of external hazard installation 
such as wind turbine, power lines                                                                                                              
Optional:  missile effects with threshold 3: 80% of 
the fragments 
Member State region 
Wallonia, Belgium 
Threshold 1: 160 mbar Threshold 1: 8 kW/m2 (unprotected installation item)                                                                       
Threshold 2: 32 kW/m2 (protected atmospheric storage)                                                                                  
Threshold 3: 44 kW/m2 (protected pressure storage) 
Threshold 1: no reference value
France Threshold 1: 200 mbar Threshold 1: 8 kW/m2 (Only for neighbouring equipment inside the 
establishment. No threshold exists: case by case) 
Greece Threshold 1: 700 mbar (for UVCE) Threshold 1: 37.5 kW/m2 (for pool fire), fireball radius (for 
BLEVE), length of the flame (for jet fire) 
No reference value 
Italy Threshold 1: 300 mbar Threshold 1: 12.5 kW/m2 (for stationary radiation)                                                                                                                                       
Threshold 2: 200-800m (fireball) 
Threshold 1: 200-800m 
Poland  Threshold 1: 1140 mbar (partially collapse of structure)                                                                              
Threshold 2: 1300 mbar (serious damages) 
Threshold 1: 37.5 kW/m2 No threshold exists: case by case, based on specific 
calculation 
Member State region 
Catalonia, Spain 
Threshold 1: 160 mbar Threshold 1: 8 kW/m2 Threshold 1: maximum reach of missiles 
The Netherlands Threshold 1: 100 mbar (storage buildings)                                              
Threshold 2: 200 mbar (atmospheric storage vessel)                                     
Threshold 3: 300 mbar (atmospheric double or full 
containment storage vessel, total collapse of dwellings)                                                                                                   
Threshold 5: 450 mbar (pressure storage vessel) 
Threshold 1: 8 kW/m2 (unprotected installation item)                                                                                                                                                                                            
Threshold 2: 10 kW/m2 (buildings and other vulnerable 
storage vessels)                                                                                            
Threshold 3: 35 - 37.5 kW/m2 (protected installation item) 
Threshold 1: the chance to hit by a missile is 0.5% 
United Kingdom, 
Great Britain 
(England, Scotland, 
Wales)a 
Threshold 1: 70 mbar For pool fire, fireball, jet fire, threshold 1: 500 thermal dose 
units (kW)4/3.s                                                                               
For flash fire, threshold 1: ½ LFL                                                                       
Threshold 2: individual risk of 0.3×10-6 chances of being 
within the flash fire envelope defined by LFL 
Threshold 1: furthest extent of missile travel from 
actual incidents (often not applied)              
    
  
 
In Germany no specific definition of domino effects exists. The evaluation is based on the “Störfall 
Verordnung”, that is a national legislation that implements Directive 96/82/EC and following 
amendments. A distinction is made between domino effects inside the establishment and those involving 
several establishments. To prevent these scenarios, the German competent authorities apply two safety 
distances (no threshold values for physical effects are applied). As a rule of thumb, lower-tier 
establishments have to show that possible escalation effects of fires and explosions are coped with up 
to 200 m from the border of the site, and upper-tier establishments are obliged to deal with fire and 
explosion effects up to 500 m. 
 
In the Netherlands, Directive 96/82/EC is implemented by the “Brzo 1999” legislation [39]. The Dutch 
competent authorities make a distinction between internal and external domino effects. In order to 
identify Seveso establishments liable to give rise to external domino effects, an easy-to-handle 
guidebook named ‘Instrument Domino Effects’ (IDE) is used [40]. The determination of a domino effect 
distance in the IDE assumes that only the immediate energy transfer mechanisms such as fragment 
impact, peak overpressure, long lasting heat radiation, and long lasting flame contact may lead to a 
domino effect. The primary accident scenarios possibly starting escalation leading to a domino effect 
can be identified as: explosion and fire for explosives and fireworks; and bursting of pressurized vessels, 
boiling liquid evaporating vapor explosion (BLEVE), vapour cloud explosions (VCE), pool fire, and 
building fire for all other hazardous materials. Hence, the IDE does not consider e.g. dust explosions, 
and all other non-flammable materials that may start primary scenarios leading to domino effects. The 
domino effect distance is calculated using data concerning installations and systems containing 
substances classified as explosive, flammable, highly flammable or extremely flammable according to 
WM categories (WM: Wet Milieubeheer, Dutch law on environment management). The IDE considers 
a fixed list of primary accident scenarios and a fixed list of physical effects leading to equipment failure, 
as well as fixed amounts of substances. Thus, the basic information required to determine safety 
distances for escalation are available. The IDE tables report the actual values of the safety distances for 
domino effect for all primary scenarios. In order to obtain the correct safety distance for a domino effect 
using the IDE, the installation type (storage tank, process equipment, loading and unloading, gas 
cylinders, storage building or storage of explosives) and the substance conditions (pressurized, 
atmospheric, cryogenic, or explosive class 1-4) need to be determined. Thus the IDE is a tool that is 
rather simple to use and that makes available numerical values for safety and escalation distances, 
although providing very conservative figures. Among the limitations of the tool, the possible protective 
effect of buildings or walls between two installations is not taken into account. 
 
In the United Kingdom, the competent authority (HSE) identifies domino groups using a contour 
established for land-use planning purposes called the Consultation Distance. This contour, where it 
overlaps with the site boundary of other establishments, is used as the basis to group establishments. 
The main purpose of designating domino groups is to ensure that operators can fully consider the 
implications of all such events affecting them and their neighbours as part of their Major Accident 
Prevention Policy (MAPP) and safety report assessments. Such assessments provide operators with the 
opportunity for a deeper analysis to identify potential sources or targets of escalation leading to domino 
scenarios. Table 5 summarizes the procedure applied for the definition of domino groups and their 
interaction. The limitation of this method is that Consultation Distances have been developed to protect 
the population, not to prevent escalation, and thus are not specific to account for escalation effects. 
 
 
 
    
  
Table 5: Procedure applied for the identification of domino groups in the UK 
Steps Description 
1 A consultation distance is set for each establishment. 
2 Where a consultation distance is waiting to be assigned, a distance of 500 m for establishments with 
flammable/explosives risks, and 1000 m for sites with toxic risks, is used. Distances are measured from 
the establishment boundary. 
3 Each establishment that has another establishment partly or fully within its consultation distance is 
identified, and for each of these establishments it is identified which establishments come within the 
consultation distance. The competent authority writes to the operators of the establishments. 
4 When received by the competent authority from the land-use-planning authority, information about 
amended maximum allowable quantities of hazardous substances is taken into account which might 
result in a change to the consultation distance. 
5 Any changes to consultation distances are reviewed to check for any impact on the domino groupings. 
6 Where the groupings are affected, step 3 is repeated. 
 
In Greece, Catalonia (Spain), France and Italy a different approach is applied, derived from land-use 
planning practices. The approaches all start from the definition of zones based on specific threshold 
values for damage to population and/or to assets. A zoning is established separating the impacted zone 
in different areas on the basis of threshold values corresponding to different types of expected damage. 
However, as stated above, no harmonisation exists, so each member state has its own zoning rules and 
thresholds.  
 
In France, for structural targets (equipment items. vessels, etc.) the domino effect zone is delimited using 
the following threshold values: 
 200 mbar overpressure for blast waves, although a modulation is possible depending on the 
materials and structures involved; 
 8 kW/m2 radiation for thermal effects. 
No threshold exists for fragment projection that is assessed on a case-by-case approach and usually only 
considered for damage to neighbouring equipment inside the establishment. Conceptually similar 
approaches, with different values assumed for damage thresholds, are applied in Italy, Catalonia and 
Greece and are not discussed in detail for the sake of brevity. Threshold values are reported in Table 4. 
It is important to highlight that even if specific requirements regarding the assessment of domino effects 
exist in the legislation, plant managers and safety analysts usually are not required to apply specific tools 
to analyse in detail such potential scenarios. Thus, safety studies usually consist in reporting the 
possibility of an escalation in an impact area identified using the threshold values for physical effects 
provided by the competent authority on the basis of the above approach, without any further assessment 
of the actual domino scenarios. 
 
In Belgium, external domino effects are investigated within the safety reports of high-tier Seveso 
establishments. In such reports, companies need to identify whether there are any external domino 
effects possible: what are the domino effects from the company to surrounding Seveso establishments, 
and what are the domino effects that the company is subject to, outgoing from surrounding Seveso 
companies. This procedure entails that the establishments have the necessary information to identify and 
to take into account domino scenarios in their risk management process. A new approach to deal with 
the problem of domino effects within chemical industrial areas is being considered, and will be 
    
  
implemented in 2015, when the Seveso-III Directive will be implemented in Belgian law. However, this 
new approach is still being finalized to date and details are not yet fully known. 
 
Finally, in Poland no specific regulations exist concerning domino scenarios, but in the current practice 
two thresholds are used for overpressure effects and one for thermal effects, to estimate potential 
damages to structures leading to escalation and cascade effects. 
 
All Member States have provided threshold values, referred to the physical effects only (Table 4), except 
Belgium and the Netherlands, where a distinction is made between target equipment, and where also the 
protection devices are taken into account for radiation effects (Fig. 3b).  
 
In order to make industrial parks safer and more secure as regards domino effects, clear definitions of 
what constitutes an industrial park, and of the phenomenon ‘domino effect’, are needed. Furthermore, 
tools to evaluate and to control industrial parks as a whole (checklists, guidelines), as well as more 
precise legislation and clear legal requirements, should be drafted and agreed upon within Europe. 
                                                                                 
6. Conclusions 
 
Although domino effects and domino scenarios are well known since decades, the definition of domino 
effect, the approach to the quantitative assessment of domino scenarios and even the technical criteria 
to identify the possibility of escalation are still discordant in the scientific literature and in technical 
standards. The revision of current practices in some EU Member States, where a specific legislation 
requiring to assess domino scenarios is in force since about 20 years, evidenced that harmonized criteria 
to cope with such scenarios are missing. Even if a significant progress was made in the scientific 
literature concerning the assessment of domino effects, industry is still missing a clear and unambiguous 
guidance on the requirements concerning the assessment of domino scenarios. Furthermore, the 
requirements of competent authorities are often limited to the identification of potential impact areas for 
escalation. In this framework, the progress toward the implementation of a shared definition of domino 
effect and of updated and widely agreed-upon threshold criteria, able to take into account differences 
among equipment categories, may represent a substantial improvement in the assessment and protection 
from severe cascading scenarios. 
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Appendix 
 
Annex.1: Assessment of domino effect distances by different EU Member States 
Country Framework for the assessment Assessment methods and software tools Assessment of threshold distances 
Specific model required Legislation related to threshold values 
Member 
State region 
Flanders, 
Belgium 
Safety reports required by Seveso II Directive. 
Regional legislation: environmental safety 
reports (OVR) required by decree of 
05/04/1995 (DABM). 
Quantitative Risk Analysis by using different 
methods and programs by the certified safety 
experts:  
Commercial programs: 
EFFECTS/RISKCURVES; PHAST RISK; 
SAVE II.  
Non-commercial programs developed by certified 
safety experts. 
Overpressure: VCE: TNO-multi-energy. BLEVE, 
Pressure vessel explosion: Baker Strehlow models. 
Radiation: Fireball: TNO, HSE, the SFPE and the 
model of Martinsen and Marx. Pool fire: POLF 
(Phast), POOLFIRE6, the TNO model, the model 
of SAVE II and the model of Mudan and Croce. 
Jet fire: Chamberlain model, Cook model, the 
model of Johnson. 
Missile: Not included in calculation domino-
effects. 
Threshold values for domino effects not in legislation, but 
described in guidelines for safety reports (guidelines from 
AMINAL). 
Member 
State region 
Wallonia, 
Belgium 
Safety reports required by Seveso II Directive. 
Regional legislation: safety studies (ES) and 
reports for hazard identification (NID) 
required by Walloon Government Decree of 
04/07/2012. 
PHAST; EFFECTS; DOMINOXL; Purple book; 
ARAMIS. 
Overpressure: No specific model required.                                      
Radiation: No specific model required. 
Missile: No specific model required. 
Regional guidelines (Vade-Mecum - spécifications 
techniques relatives au contenu et à la présentation des 
études de sureté, des notices d’identification des dangers 
et des rapports de sécurité (partie région wallonne) Janvier 
2005. 
Member 
State region 
Catalonia, 
Spain 
Safety reports required by Seveso II Directive. EFFECTS; ALOHA; RISKCURVES; Purple 
book; Reference Manual Bevi Risk Assessments 
(Bevi 3.2). 
Overpressure: TNT equivalent, Multi-energy 
Yellow book, Purple book. 
Radiation: Green book, Yellow book, Bevi 3.2. 
Missile: no specific required model. 
Decret 174/2001 de la Generalitat de Catalunya 
correspondent a l’aplicació a Catalunya del Real Decreto 
1254/1999 de 16 de juliol de 1999 (B. O. E. de 20 de juliol 
de 1999). 
Directriz Básica de protección civil para el control y 
planificación ante el riesgo de accidentes graves en los 
que intervienen substancias peligrosas aprobada por el 
Real Decreto 1196/2003 de 19 de Setiembre de 2003 (B. 
O. E. de 9 de Octubre de 2003). 
Llei 12/2008 de 31 de juliol de Seguretat Industrial 
(DOGC nº 5191 de 8 d’agost de 2008). 
Instrucció 11/2010 SIE (Generalitat de Catalunya, 29 
d’octubre de 2010). 
 
    
  
Annex.1: Assessment of domino effect distances by different EU Member States- cont'd 
Country Framework for the assessment Assessment methods and software tools Assessment of threshold distances 
Specific model required Legislation related to threshold values 
France Safety reports required by Seveso II Directive. Guidance and recommendation given in 
Circulaire du 10 Mai 2010. 
No specific assessment method required. 
Overpressure: VCE: Multi Energy (Yellow 
Book), CAMa, or Baker Strehlow models. BLEVE:  
model of Shield (TRCb) (for filling degree 
between 30% and 85 % otherwise no specific 
model required). 
Radiation:  Fireball: model of Shield (TRC) (for 
filling degree between 30% and 85 % otherwise no 
specific model required). 
Missile: No specific model required. 
French legislation (Ministerial decree of 29 September 
2005 concerning the evaluation and consideration of the 
probability of occurrence, the kinetics, the intensity of the 
effects, and the severity of the consequences of potential 
accidents in hazard studies). 
Greece Safety reports required by Seveso-II Directive. EFFECTS; ALOHA; PHAST; SOCRATES. 
 
Overpressure: TNT equivalent, Multi-energy, 
Yellow book, Purple book. 
Radiation: Green book, Yellow book. 
Missile: no specific model required. 
None (not defined in legislation). The values given in 
Table 4 are used in Greek practice. 
Italy Safety reports required by the Italian 
implementation of Seveso-II Directive 
(D.Lgs.334/99). 
General criteria given in DPCM 31/3/1989.  
No specific assessment method required. 
Overpressure: No specific model required. 
Radiation: No specific model required. 
Missile: No specific model required. 
D.M. 09/05/2001 (Requisitiminimi di sicurezza in materia 
di pianificazione urbanistica e territoriale per le zone 
interessate dastabilimenti a rischio di incidente rilevante). 
Poland Safety reports required by Seveso II Directive. No specific assessment method required. Overpressure: No specific model required. 
Radiation: No specific model required. 
Missile: No specific model required. 
None (not defined in legislation). The values given in 
Table 4 are used in Polish practice. 
The 
Netherlands 
Safety reports required by Seveso II Directive. 
Quantitative Risk Analysis reports required by 
decree of Bevi (Besluit externe veiligheid 
inrichtingen). 
Reference Manual Bevi Risk Assessments; 
Instrument Domino Effects; Publication series 
of hazardous substances (Publicatiereeks 
Gevaarlijke Stoffen, PGS). 
SAFETI-NL; PHAST; Risk-NL. 
Overpressure: TNT equivalent or multi energy 
model (TNO) Yellow Book, AASTP-1.                                             
Radiation: Green Book, Yellow Book, AASTP-1.                                                                            
Missile: Green Book; AASTP-1.                                  
Dutch legislation (Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning 
and Environment: BRZO 1999 and BEVI 27-04-2004). 
a CAM: Congestion Assessment Method, Shell. b Thornton Research Centre (SHELL research center). 
    
  
Annex.1: Assessment of domino effect distances by different EU Member States- cont'd 
 
Country Framework for the assessment Assessment methods and software tools 
Assessment of threshold distances 
Specific  model required Legislation related to threshold values 
United 
Kingdom, 
Great Britain 
(England, 
Scotland, 
Wales) 
COMAH (Seveso) notifications. 
Land use planning - hazardous substances 
consent. 
Notification by the competent Authority of 
domino groupings. 
Land use planning risk assessments. Either:  
1) Quantified risk assessments (risk of receiving a 
specified dangerous dose) 
2) Protection concept assessments (range to a 
specified level of harm, usually threshold of 
fatality for a vulnerable population) 
Or: Some combination of the above for a 
particular establishment. 
Overpressure: TNO  multi energy method for 
VCE and TNT equivalence for solid phase 
explosives. 
Thermal radiation: HSE in-house models for 
pool fire, fireball and jet fire. 
Flash fire: dispersion using DRIFT dispersion 
model. 
Toxic gas: dense or passive gas dispersion using 
DRIFT. Warehouse fire using HSE in-house 
model for pesticide warehouse fires. 
Oxygen enrichment: dispersion using DRIFT. 
Missiles: based on analysis of past incidents. 
None (not defined in legislation). Set as assessment policy 
by HSE for the purposes of providing land use planning 
advice. 
